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Virtual organization emerged as a highly flexible structure in response to the rapidly 
changing environment of 20
th century. This organization consists of independently working parties 
that combine their best possible resources to exploit the emerging market opportunities. There are 
no formal control and coordination mechanisms employed by the classical hierarchical structures. 
Parties, therefore, manage their dependencies on each other through mutual understanding and trust. 
Mathematician John Nash, having significant contributions in Game Theory suggests that in 
every non-cooperative game there is at least one equilibrium point. At this point, according to him, 
every strategy of the player represents a response to the others’ strategies. Such equilibria could 
exist in a virtual organization, at which parties coordinate which each other to optimize their 
performance. 
Coordination/Matching problems are likely to arise among game theoretically coordinating 
parties in a virtual organization, mainly due to lack of binding agreements. By identifying and 
resolving these matching problems, virtual organizations could achieve efficiency and better 
coordination among parties.    
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1. Introduction 
  Organizational environment is rapidly changing toward increasing complexity and 
challenges. This change has first been recorded as ‘environmental turbulence’ by Emery and Trist in 
1965. They contend that the environment in which organization exists is also changing at a rapid 
pace [12]. The effect is the emergence of new organizational forms capable of keeping pace with 
rapidly changing environment. These organizations have variously been described as modern and 
postmodern organization [5]; organization of the future [20] and the next generation enterprise [25]. 
Tremendous potential exists within these contemporary structures to respond to the market changes 
[47].  
  Within these contemporary structures, virtual organizations are considered as the most 
flexible arrangement of enterprise. Badrinarayanan and Arnett [2], present three major reasons of 
the emergence of virtual organization i.e. the development of flatter, decentralized and adaptive 
organizational structures; collaborations of geographically dispersed parties and advances in 
technology. These are the elements of virtual organizations which make them capable of competing 
with the market forces. Along with these elements, the importance of coordination and trust can 
never be ignored for parties in a virtual organization [30], [16]. According to Malone and Crowston BRAND. Broad Research in Accounting, Negotiation, and Distribution 
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[30], ‘coordination is managing dependencies between activities’ (p.90). Trust, on the other hand, 
creates mutual understanding among parties which is necessary to ensure coordination.  
  Virtual organization has been the focus of many contemporary organizational development 
researchers. After the pioneering work of Davidow and Malone in 1992, several researchers have 
attempted to explore the concept from different perspectives. Virtual organization has been 
extensively studied for the use of information and communication technology, coordination and 
trust among parties, geographical location of parties and the networking of enterprises. One of the 
areas which is still lacking in literature is behavioral aspect of coordination. Therefore, specific 
mechanisms of coordination and the problems arising out of virtual coordination among parties 
offer significant potential for research. In an effort to explore this area, the problems of matching or 
coordination among game theoretically coordinating parties of virtual organizations have been 
identified by Yasir and Majid [47]. This was a pioneering research in several respects as it not only 
provided theoretical foundations for the study of game theoretic coordination in virtual 
organizations but also elucidated possible matching problems among parties. 
  Study of game theoretic relationship among organizations is not a new idea. Yasir and Majid 
[47] report that researchers as Schmidt and Kochan [36] have applied game theory to explore the 
relationship among organizations. This research, therefore, focuses merely upon the game theoretic 
relationship among parties in a virtual organization and matching problems arising thereof. It is 
based on prior conceptual study by the authors and provides empirical evidence of the matching 
problems among virtually coordinating parties.   
  The study of virtual organization reveals that it is a temporary grouping of parties to exploit 
the emerging market opportunities. The presence of flexible, non-enforceable agreements among 
parties and their independent moves toward a common goal suggest that their relationship could be 
modeled as a non-cooperative game. Nash equilibrium could exist among parties at which all the 
parties may operate at their optimum performance level to achieve common objectives. The results 
of this research reveal that matching problems arise during the relationship due to presence of 
multiple Nash equilibria, lack of harmony, and coordination among parties etc. These were 
predominantly attributable to the absence of formal control among parties.      
  This research empirically investigated the matching problems arising among game 
theoretically coordinating parties in a virtual organization. Data was collected using unstructured 
interviews and observation. Small and medium enterprise (SME) clusters in Pakistan which 
demonstrated considerable characteristics of virtual organization were the focus of this study. After 
a review of relevant literature, methodology for this study is presented which becomes the basis for 
the discussion on possible solutions for matching problems. Using the results of this research, 
parties in a virtual organization could manage to achieve their joint objectives more effectively. 
Moreover, the researchers can employ the discussion and results of this research for exploring new 
areas of game theory and virtual relationship among organizations.  
 
2. Literature review 
  This section presents a discussion about key elements of virtual organization and identifies 
how game theory could be applied to study the coordination and matching problems among parties. 
A separate explanation of each of these concepts is as the following:  
 
2.1. Virtual Organization 
  Virtual organization is considered as the most contemporary structure capable of competing 
with the turbulent environment of today. Although virtual relationship in some form existed among 
organizations of the past, the concept of virtual organization itself emerged only two decades ago 
[14]. Virtual organization is considered to have gained widespread acceptance due to the need for 
collaborative relationship among enterprises for sharing diverse technical and human resource skills 
[9], [46]. Researchers also present advancements in information and communication technology 
[24]; formation of geographically distributed work groups [10] and the need for a continuous BRAND. Broad Research in Accounting, Negotiation, and Distribution 
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change and market orientation [1] as significant factors influencing the emergence of virtual 
organization.   
  Hence, the virtual organization could be defined as a group of independent parties, 
temporarily linking together by means of electronic communication and information technology to 
attain a common objective [9], [15], [21], [46]. Researchers [28] argue that these organizations use 
ICTs to work across space, time, and organizational boundaries. For the success of such 
geographically distributed organizations, development of trust among parties is essential [16]. Trust 
is a bond which keeps the independently working parties together, especially in the absence of any 
formal controls [4], [7], [22]. Thus, in the words of Harrington and Ruppel [17], “a virtual 
corporation is built on the core competencies, but it is cemented with trust” (p. 224). 
  Whereas trust is a bond which keeps the parties together in a virtual organization, 
coordination helps them in successfully managing their relationships [30]. Coordination has long 
been considered as a solution to problems arising from interdependence of organizational units; see 
for example [8]. Therefore, in the case of virtual organization where parties are strongly 
interdependent for the accomplishment of their tasks, coordination has particular significance [7], 
[30], [44].  Coordination in a virtual organization has been discussed by researchers with respect to 
the role of ICTs [11], [43]; trust [22] and geographical location [34] etc. Different mechanisms of 
coordination, therefore, have also been proposed to work with these elements of virtual 
organization.  
Despite a good deal of work done in this discipline, the area which remained unexplored 
until the work of Yasir and Majid [47], is game theoretic coordination in a virtual organization. The 
research established theoretical foundations for game theoretic coordination and the associated 
matching problems in virtual organizations. Based on the arguments established in [47], in this 
research we are providing empirical analysis of matching problems among game theoretically 
coordinating parties in a virtual organization. Before entering the discussion of game theoretic 
coordination and matching problems, we are providing a brief introduction of game theory and its 
relationship with virtual organization. 
 
2.2. Game Theory 
  Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics which in its present form has been 
presented by Neumann and Morgenstern [45]. It has diverse applications in various fields including 
economics and management. A game according to [40] is a situation in which parties interact and 
their outcomes depend on the strategies of each other. Thus game theory is the study of conflict and 
cooperation between parties. 
  Game theory has broadly been divided into two branches i.e. cooperative and non-
cooperative games. The difference between these two lies in the presence or possibility of binding 
agreements between parties. Whereas, the cooperative games allow for communication and 
formation of binding agreements [38]; in non-cooperative games there are no such agreements 
among parties [3]. In the absence of binding agreements in non-cooperative games, [19] explains 
that players must agree on a stable and efficient equilibrium point. The presence of equilibrium 
points in a non-cooperative game was proved for the first time by John F. Nash [33] who called it a 
‘Nash Equilibrium’. Although according to Nash [33] there could be more than one equilibria in a 
game, a stable and efficient equilibrium point provides maximum payoffs to all the players at a 
specific joint strategy. Therefore, at such an optimal equilibrium point according to Chamberlin [3], 
“no player can do better by unilaterally switching to another strategy” (p. 264). The following 
discussion provides an explanation of Nash equilibrium and game theoretic coordination in a virtual 
organization. 
 
2.3. Game Theory and Virtual Organization 
  A review of literature on virtual organizations suggests that these are temporary 
combinations of geographically dispersed and independently working parties, coordinating with BRAND. Broad Research in Accounting, Negotiation, and Distribution 
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each other using mechanisms of ICTs and trust. In a situation where no binding agreement exists 
among parties but they work independently for a common purpose, their relationship could be 
modeled in the form a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.  
Nash [33] states that in non-cooperative games players cannot form binding agreements thus 
they must agree on an equilibrium point which may satisfy the appropriate stability and efficiency 
requirements of a game [18]. At least one such equilibrium point exists in every finite non-
cooperative game [33] and at an optimal Nash equilibrium “every player is playing a best reply to 
the behavior of the other players” [29, p.1348]. A recent study, [27] also presents optimal Nash 
equilibrium as a pair of strategies representing best response to each other and the players have no 
motivation to change their strategies.  
In a virtual organization Nash equilibrium would be the optimal equilibrium point at which 
all the parties agree to accomplish their common objectives. Parties coordinate with each other at an 
optimum performance level because this helps them achieve the targets which are not individually 
achievable [9], [31]. With the parties organized at an optimal Nash equilibrium, coordination among 
them could be called as ‘Game Theoretic’. Empirical research on game theoretic coordination in a 
virtual organization suggests that it is different from coordination in classical organization. This 
difference exists because of the lack of formal controls and non-enforceability of agreements among 
parties.  
In a virtual organization, parties freely choose the most suitable group members after 
considering all the potential matches (enterprises). This could be a representation of many-to-many 
stable matching [35]. The discussion on matching one kind of agent with another started with the 
work of Gale and Shapely [13]. They introduced two-sided matching models while focusing on the 
college admissions and marriages. According to [13], the matching problem was to make stable 
pairs in which agents on each side could find a match for themselves from the opposite side, for 
example, matching potential students with the colleges offering admissions, or matching men and 
women for a stable marriage. Later on, [39], and [23], applied two-sided matching models to the 
study of labor market and firms’ preferences. Szilagyi and Schweiger [41] provided a framework for 
matching managers to strategies of organizations, while relatively recently, [26] discussed credible 
group stability in many-to-many matching problems, taking the case of UK hospital interns. The 
review of this literature reveals that substantial theory-based and empirical research exists on 
matching problems in the organizations but no research has specifically explored the matching 
problems arising out of a virtual relationship.  
Due to the temporary and market-based nature of virtual organizations, it could be argued 
that the matching among parties in these organizations must be stable which ensures that the parties 
are matched with the most suitable counterparts. The relationship of trust and mutual understanding 
developed among parties in a virtual organization is also important to ensure a stable matching. It is 
only with a stable matching among parties that they could achieve the efficiency and effectiveness 
required for the success of a virtual organization.  
However, it has been observed that due to the non-binding agreements and lack of formal 
control, matching or coordination problems [37] could arise among parties. Even with a stable 
matching of parties in a virtual organization, they could face challenges in organizing at an optimal 
Nash equilibrium; hence, matching problems are likely to arise. In [47] the possible matching 
problems that could arise out of game theoretic relationship have been explained. Here we are 
providing an empirical evidence of the existence of these problems with the help of a qualitative 
study of the virtual organization in Pakistan. Solutions to these problems as observed by the authors 
in the practice of enterprises forming a virtual relationship or proposed on the basis of the activities 
of enterprises have also been provided in the discussion section. 
 
3. Methodology  
  The purpose of this study was to conduct an empirical investigation into the matching 
problems among game theoretically coordinating parties in a virtual organization. Therefore, the BRAND. Broad Research in Accounting, Negotiation, and Distribution 
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focus of our research during the field data collection was specifically upon the matching problems 
arising out of a virtual relationship among enterprises. The matching problems identified in [47] 
were used for this research. For the purpose of collecting data, unstructured interviews of 
managers/owners and observation of the relevant manufacturing concerns were used. Responses/ 
observation were recorded using diary method. The observation and interviews were conducted by 
the researchers themselves which left hardly any chance of ambiguity in recording.   
  In order to select a sample, the SMEs in the industrial clusters in Pakistan were studied for 
their nature and activities. After a detailed review, four industrial clusters were selected on the basis 
of the diversity in the nature of their activities and the presence of networking among enterprises in 
these clusters. These were the clusters of enterprises manufacturing readymade garments, surgical 
instruments, light engineering, and cutlery. In the next stage, a sample of 20 enterprises from each 
industrial cluster, that agreed to respond to the research, was drawn from among these four clusters 
of SMEs in Pakistan. Thus 80 enterprises in total were selected for this study. These clusters 
represented both the small and medium scale as well as low and high technology industries. The 
proportion of small and medium scale enterprises in each cluster in given out in Figure 1. The 
respondents in most of the cases were the owner managers but in some cases other officials having 
complete knowledge of the enterprise and its activities were interviewed with the permission of the 
top management. As the nature of goods manufactured was not important for this research, no 
distinction was made among them while recording the responses. 
 
 
Figure 1: A description of the size of firms in each cluster 
 
  The matching problems arising among parties and the percentage of responses for either the 
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Table 1: Percentage response to the existence or non-existence of matching problems (N= 80) 
Matching Problems  Agree %  Disagree % 
Presence of multiple Nash equilibria  98.8  1.2 
Lack of harmony between activities  43.8  56.2 
Lack of common objectives of all parties  12.5  87.5 
Problem of sharing resources  3.8  96.2 
Problem of sharing responsibilities and division of labor  32.5  67.5 
Sharing risk  51.2  48.8 
Problem of establishing trust  2.5  97.5 
Problem of maintaining control  72.5  27.5 
Problem of timely response and completion of work   23.8  76.2 
Problems in gaining competitive edge  85  15 
Problems in capturing fads’ market  66.2  33.8 
 
4. Discussion 
  The results of interviews and observation of organizations for finding the possible matching 
problems suggest that for some of the problems there was almost complete agreement among 
parties that the problems exist while others showed mixed responses. For the presence of multiple 
Nash equilibria, 98.8 percent enterprises responded that the problem existed among virtually 
working parties. According to the respondents in these enterprises, the problem was solved by the 
information sharing and meetings in the beginning of a virtual relationship as well as at every step 
during the project.  
About the issue of lack of harmony between activities, 43.8 percent agreed that the problem 
existed but 56.2 percent enterprises responded that creating harmony was not a problem due to the 
self-interest of all the parties involved in the activity. Those who responded positively toward the 
existence of problem were observed to have maintained a central coordinating body of all the 
members which had no power to enforce its decisions but worked to maintain harmony and 
establish coordination. 
Strong disagreement was found for the existence of lack of common objectives and 
problems in sharing resources. Whereas, 12.5 percent enterprises agreed that the problem of lack of 
common objectives existed among parties, only 3.8 percent agreed to the existence of the problem 
of sharing resources. Major reason for a strong disagreement with the existence of these problems 
was found to be the geographical proximity of parties and the effect of social controls which 
prevented them from defection.     
  For the problem of sharing the responsibilities 32.5 percent agreed that this was a problem 
while working virtually. This problem used to be solved mostly with mutual agreement as there was 
no legally binding or written agreement among parties. Against it 51.2 percent enterprises 
responded that sharing risks was a problem. In many cases this problem resulted in the dissolution 
of virtual relationship due to the fragile nature of agreements among parties.  
  In an environment like Pakistan where business relationships mostly are based on trust 97.5 
percent of enterprises appeared to have disagreed that establishing trust was a problem for them. On 
the other hand, even in this high trust environment maintaining control was found to be a serious 
problem where 72.5 percent enterprises reported that they found it difficult to maintain control 
while working in a virtual organization. All they could do to maintain a control was calling a joint 
meeting of central coordinating body to resolve the issues which was not effective in every case.   
    For the problem of timely response and completion of work, 76.2 percent disagreed that it 
was a problem. The reason of a timely response was that most of the parties coordinated because 
efficient and effective accomplishment of work was in their own interest. For the problems of 
gaining competitive edge and capturing fad’s market 85 percent and 66.2 percent enterprises BRAND. Broad Research in Accounting, Negotiation, and Distribution 
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responded respectively that those were serious problems. Reason of these problems was found to be 
the lack of advanced technical skills and resources.  
 
5. Conclusion 
  The results of this research signify that there are several matching problems existing among 
game theoretically coordinating parties in a virtual organization. These problems are caused not 
only by the lack of binding agreements but also due to the need for technological advancement and 
skills enhancement of workers. By finding solutions to these matching problems, virtual 
organizations could gain efficiency and effectiveness required to remain competitive in the national 
as well as international markets. Moreover, the existence and extent of these matching problems in 
the real organizations could be studied and compared with the results of virtual organizations in the 
future endeavors of researchers.  
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